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Irlenbusch, Bernd and Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike and Schuetze, Joerg and Sutter, Matthias (2003) Voting in EMU - An Experimental Study of Institutional Innovation and the Role of Communication in the Stability and Growth Pact. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41. pp. 645-664.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the EU's economic and monetary union (EMU) aims to assure sound public finances in the EMU Member States by providing for sanctions against countries with excessive deficits. We experimentally examine the voting procedure of the SGP and find that the institutional rules are not at all satisfactory. As an institutional innovation, we test a procedure where fiscal sinners are excluded from voting, as suggested by Otmar Issing. It turns out that this modification is surprisingly successful. In addition, our study shows that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact and tends to mitigate the Pact's shortcomings. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.

Item Type: Article
Depositing User: Dr. Joerg Schuetze
Date Deposited: 25 Jun 2012 06:17
Last Modified: 29 Jun 2012 21:05
URI: http://opendepot.org/id/eprint/1168

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