A page from the OpenDepot.org service

Jump to the start of the main contents

Ballinger, Clint (2007) Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248 (Submitted)

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (215Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    This article shows how the social sciences, including human geography, rejected hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century largely on the deontological basis that it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom been recognized in the social sciences. Thus many current social science and human geography views on determinism and social justice are antiquated, ignoring numerous common and well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The article concludes with a brief consideration of deterministic consequentialist ethics, social justice, and the problems of egoism and altruism.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: consequentialist ethics; determinism; free will; social justice; social sciences
    Subjects: Historical and Philosophical studies > Philosophy > Moral Philosophy
    Social studies > Politics > Political Theories
    Historical and Philosophical studies > Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
    Social studies > Human and Social Geography
    Social studies
    Divisions: UNSPECIFIED
    Depositing User: Clint Ballinger
    Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2008 04:45
    Last Modified: 23 Aug 2010 14:26
    URI: http://opendepot.org/id/eprint/190

    Available Versions of this Item

    Actions (login required)

    View Item